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-2In support of this petition
respondents submit the following brief
argument with citation of authorities:
1.

THE VENDOR'S LIEN WAS KEPT ALIVE

IN THE WURST ACTION.
In the Court's opinion reference is
made in the fourth paragraph to the action
which the Polleis brought against the Wursts
in which they attempted to collect the balance
owing on the contract, whereas in the present
action the Polleis are seeking foreclosure
of the vendor's lien on the property, as
to which the opinion observed:

"a theory

not asserted against the Wursts in the
previous action.

Nor did Polleis join

the defendants Burger in the Wurst action
by virtue of any such theory or caµse of-

action."
Since the Wurst pleadings were
not before the Court in connection with
this argument but they were before the
District court, that file has been requested

-3and is now available to this Court as a
matter of judicial notice.

In the trial

of the Burger action counsel for the Polleis
asked the Court to take judicial notice

of the file in the Wurst action which was
case No. 166302.

Counsel for the Burgers

were asked if they had any objection and
stated that they had "no objection."
the Court stated:

Thereupon

"The Court will take

judicial notice of the file referred to."
(Tr. 43).

The lis pendens filed in connection

with the Wurst action was also offered
in evidence and was made Exhibit 6 in the
principal action (Tr. 44).

As to the reason

for these documents counsel stated:

"I

don't know there is any particular grounds
made of the circumstances of this action.
Under the pleadings I am not sure what
they claim as to their grounds. of waiver,
and that is why I am including this complaint,
and the lis pendens." and thereafter no point
I

-4was made of waiver and we assumed the matter
was taken care of, except that it was revived
by this Honorable Court in its opinion.

Examination of that file discloses
that in Paragraph 8 of the complaint the
Polleis specifically pleaded that they
had retained an interest as vendors "and
are entitled to have a vendor's lien declared
junior only to the first mortgage as security
for the payment of the accruing installments."
and in the stipulation for judgment in that
action i t was stipulated specifically that
the judgment left open and unprejudiced
the right of the plaintiffs against subsequent
purchasers of the property in the event
defendants failed to pay the judgment and
also any rights which the subsequent purchasers
might have against the Wursts if the Wursts
failed to pay the judgment.

We suggest

that this is important not only as negativing the waiver, but as indicating that

-5the Burgers might well have a cause of

action against the Wursts for breach of
warranty, or even for fraud which would
survive bankruptcy, if the Wursts failed
to pay the judgment.
The notice of lis pendens which
was filed with reference to action No.
166302 and which is Exhibit 6 in the action
at bar specifically stated that the Polleis
claim "a vendor's lien for unpaid purchase
price."
And as further evidence that there
was no waiver or abandonment insofar as
the Burgers are concerned Exhibit 5 was
put in evidence in the case at bar, which
the Burgers acknowledged receiving (Tr.
43, 54, 59) which letter was dated May
12, 1966, only fourteen days after the
warranty deed from Wursts to Burger by which
the Wursts were advised, with certified mail

-6copy to the Burgers, that unless the monthly
payments were made the i9terest of the
wursts

(and the Burgers) in the property

would be forfeited.
2.

A WARRANTY DEED ABSOLUTE IN

TERMS DOES NOT PRECLUDE A VENDOR'S LIEN.
The existence of a vendor's lien
after giving a warranty deed is established
by this court in McMurdie v. Chugg, et al.,

99 Utah 403, 107 P2d 163, 132 ALR 435.
There Anderson, the vendor, agreed to sell
to the Chuggs for $3,500.00 certain property.
The Chuggs paid a part of the purchase
price and gave notes for the balance, whereupon Anderson executed a warranty deed
in 1929.

In 1933 the parties agreed that

$440.00 was still due and the Chuggs then
gave two unsecured promissory notes for

$140.00 and $300.00 providing for attorneys
fees upon collection action.

Anderson

died in 1939 and McMurdie was appointed

-?administrator and brought the action.

The

plaintiff obtained judgment, but it was
held that there was no vendor's lien.

The

plaintiff appealed contending that the
vendor's lien persisted and was not cut
off by the defendants' claim of homestead

and had not been waived or abandoned.
This court had before it first
the question of the validity of a statute
providing for execution of the purchase
price against a homestead and secondly,
"whether a seller retains his vendor's
lien on land until he is fully paid even
though he takes promissory notes in the
of the unpaid purchase price."
This court upheld the vendor's lien despite
the giving of the notes, but held that
the attorneys fees provided in the replacement
notes were inferior to the claim of homestead,
saying:
"It is a well established

-8rule of law that a vendor
does not waive his vendor's
lien for the purchase price
simply by taking the vendee's
own personal note for the
amount due.
If the vendor
accepts the obligation of a
third party or if he expressly
waives his lien, it may be
extinguished, but the taking
of the personal, unsecured
promissory note of the buyer
cannot be held to be a waiver
of the lien."
The court also relied on Harris v. Larsen,
24 Utah 139, 66 Pac. 782, where acceptance

of a number of hogs as a part of the purchase
price was held not to extinguish or be
a waiver of a vendor's lien.

In the annotation at 132 ALR following
the reprinting of the

case appears

this statement:
"The general rule is that where
a vendor of property takes no
other form of security than
the vendee's own note, bond,
covenant, bill or other promise,
as a recognition of the amount
owing on the purchase price,
his vendor's lien remains in
full force, and is not waived or

-9-

discharged, unless an intention
to the contrary is expressed or
clearly evidenced from the
cumstances."
The court cites Petrofesa v.
D. & R.G.W.R. Co., 110 Utah 109, 169 P.2d 808
as somehow indicating that a vendor's lien

does not survive a warranty deed.

It holds

that a water right is an appurtenance and
is conveyed by a statutory warranty deed.
No vendor's lien was involved in that case
and we respectfully submit that McMurdie
expresses the law in Utah that the giving
of a warranty deed does not preclude the
existence of a vendor's lien.

This rule

is amply supported by the other cases cited
herein.
The court also refers to Peterson
v. Carter, 11 Utah 2d 381, 359 P.2d 1055
which was discussed by both appellants
and respondents in their briefs.

The Peterson

case recognizes the existence of a vendor's

-10lien following the giving of a warranty
need, but goes off on the question of waiver
and estoppel for the reason that the vendor
handled the funds arising from the later
sale of the properties involved and had
ample opportunity to discharge the vendor's
lien which i t failed to do.

The court

concluded its opinion in Peterson by saying:
"* * *it was plaintiffs' own
failure to protect themselves,
and that they had waived any
claim to any real or illusory
vendor's lien."
3.

THE POLLEIS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR

VENDOR 1 S LIEN.
There was no waiver by the Polleis
in this case by abandonment of the vendor's
lien in failing to mention it in the action
brought against the Burgers, because the
complaint there plainly recites the vendor's
lien in paragraph 8.
The intention of the Polleis to
assert the vendor's lien was also plainly

-11-

evidenced by Exhibit 6 which was a lis pendens
claiming vendor's lien in the Wurst (or first)
action.
According to the authorities,
agreeing that part of the purchase price
would be paid by a mortgage on the property
itself, is not a waiver of the vendor's
lien as to the unpaid

of the purchase

price, which is admittedly inferior to
the mortgage lien:
"Where the vendee mortgages
the property in order to
obtain money for part payment
of the price, of which the
vendor had knowledge, such
mortgage does not waive or
destroy the vendor's implied
lien, in the absence of conduct on the part of the vendor
showing an intention otherwise
* * *." 92 C.J.S., Vendor
and Purchaser, § 409, page
353.
The note cites two Florida cases and an
Indiana case and the supplemental annotations
cite a North Dakota case.

-12In Koppinger v. Implement Dealers
Insurance Co.

(North Dakota 1963),

122 N.W.2d 134, a vendor's lien was established
by statute, with no reference to the giving

of a deed, which was done.

"The evidence shows that the
Candees, with Koppinger's
consent, executed a mortgage
and obtained a loan of $2,700.00
on the premises.
It is argued
that this act on the vendor's
part constituted a waiver of
the vendor's lien that completely
extinguished it. This is clearly
not the case. The effect of the
consent was to waive the priority
of the vendor's lien so that it
became subject to the mortgage.
It did not destroy the lien. * * *
"At the time the sale was made,
there remained of the purchase
price the sum of $1,500.00 that
the buyer was obligated to pay
the vendor. This sum was
unsecured and evidenced by the
personal note of the buyer. Under
the provisions of Section 35-20-01,
N.D.C.C. the vendor had a statutory
lien on the property sold for that
amount. The lien was not extinguished by the mortgage given
by the buyer with the consent
of the vendor, although the

-13-

priority of the lien was
waived as to that mortgage."
Pages 136, 137.'
is a similar holding in Old First
tional Bank & Trust Co. v. Scheuman, 13
N.E.2d 551, 214 Ind. 652, 119 ALR 1165.

In that case there was a contract for payment
of the purchase price on a tract of land
with provision for a mortgage following
the giving of a deed which did not reserve
a vendor's lien, and also with provision
for outside security as to part of the
debt as well as inclusion of some personal
property with the real estate.

The court

carefully considered all of these as claimed
waivers of the vendor's lien, noting that
the burden was on the vendee to repel the
presumption and held that the vendor's
lien was not waived. At page 557 of 13
N.E.2d the court considered the agreement
to apply for a loan on the premises as
to which it said:

-14"But we do not think that this
fact would amount to a waiver
of the lien. There is no evidence that any mortgage was
ever given on the real estate
described except the mortgage
existing at the time of the sale.
The waiver, if any, would only
be the extent of the mortgage
made and would not take effect
unless the mortgage was in fact
made."
(citing authorities)

The court cited Jones on Liens, Vol. II,
paragraph 1079, as saying that if a mortgage
had been given the "lien will still attach
to the equity of redemption of the vendee,
and upon the surplus."
In Patton v. Meddick, 122 S. 710,
97 Fla. 1073, the court thus refers to

the vendor's lien at page 711:
"It is a right given to the
vendor of land who has conveyed
title and reserved no lien nor
taken security for the purchase
price other than the grantee's
personal obligation where the
rights of others are not injured
and it is equitable to sustain
the lien. Even where the vendor
knew that the purchaser borrowed
money to make a payment and gave
a mortgage to secure the loan,
such transaction does not destroy

-15or waive the vendor's lien
where no conduct of the vendor
causes a waiver. Even where by
direction of the purchaser the
title is conveyed to another,
the vendor's lien follows the
land without any special agreement."
In McGreevy, et al. v. Constitution
Life Insurance Co.

(District Court of

Appeals), 47 Cal. Rptr. 711, the court
considered the persistence of a vendor's
lien in a complicated sale involving part
cash, a promissory note, part out of oil
royalties and part out of stock to be sold
from a public offering, followed by an
agreement for production of part of the
price from a mortgage of the oil and gas
:eases involved.

The court proceeded on

the assumption that the vendor's lien is
presumed to exist and that the vendee has
the burden of showing that the vendor intended
to waive his lien:
"Upon the transfer of title of

-16any real property, the seller
has a vendor's lien for so
much of the price as remains
unpaid.
(Civ. Code, paragraph
3046.)
A bona fide purchaser
or encumbrancer for value takes
precedence over the seller's
lien.
But, otherwise, the
lien is good, u,nless it has been
waived.
(Citing cases)
A
waiver may be affected without
the observance of any particular
formality.
But the burden of
proof is upon anyone who claims
that a waiver has taken place.
Any action which shows an intent
by the seller to waive the vendor's
lien, such as taking independent
security for the payment of the
balance due for the land, or
entering into an agreement which
shows by its terms that the
seller desires to waive the lien,
is sufficient to establish the
right of later lien holders to
rely upon their security as
prior to the vendor's lien."
A case similar to the case at bar
was Johnson v. Fugate

(Okla. 1956) 293

P.2d 559, 55 ALR 2d 1115.

A parcel of

land was sold for $8,000.00 of which $6,000.00
was produced by a mortgage given by the
purchaser following the giving of the deed
by the vendor, which deed made no reference

-17-

lien.

The question before

was whether the vendor's lien
surviv8d the deed and the mortgage and
prior to the mortgage.

The District

court held that the vendor's lien was prior
to the mortgage, which decision was reversed
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court which decreed

that the defendant's mortgage lien was
"prior and superior to the lien asserted
by ?laintiff for the unpaid balance of

the purchase price."

(Page 1118)

This

case in 55 ALR 2d is followed by an annotation
at page 1119 considering "priority as between
vendor's lien and mortgage or deed of trust
to third person furnishing purchase money."
The conclusion of the annotation is that
priority depends on the circumstances of
each particular case, but all recognize
that the vendor's lien survives the giving
of a mortgage to the purchaser which furnishes
part of the purchase price.

-18CONCLUSION
Respondents submit that Utah recognizes
a vendor's lien which survives the giving

o:

a warranty deed.

The authorities hold

generally that such a vendor's lien persists
when the purchaser mortgages the property
and uses the proceeds to pay part of the
purchase price.

The question of priority

as between Zions First National Bank and
the vendor does not arise in this case,
since the vendors concede priority to the
ffiOrtgage.
The conduct of the Polleis has
been consistent only with the maintenance
of the lien and in the conduct of their
litigation they have carefully preserved
the claim of lien and at the same time
have preserved for these defendants a possible
cause of action against the original purchasers
who became judgment proof or under their

-19-

(Tr. 54)
The court is urged to grant a
from its decision of January

2c .:;.n view of the nonwai ver of the vendor's
lien

is shown by the pleadings in

the Wurst action now brought before the
court and before the District Court by
consent of all the parties.

The claim

of waiver was not urged in the District
Court, presumably because the facts showed
there had been no waiver.

The matter

of waiver was not urged upon this court
by appellants and for that reason the file

the Wurst action was not previously
made available to this court.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD L. Bl RD. JR;.

RICHARD L. BIRD, JR. Of
RICHARDS & WATKINS
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents

